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JURISDICTION 
Respondent, ("Kennecott"), agrees with the statement of 
jurisdiction contained in petitioner's brief, Kennecott will 
not in this brief restate the jurisdiction of the court to hear 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal by the County Board of Equalization of Salt 
Lake County (the "County"), is from a formal decision of the 
Utah State Tax Commission, (the "Commission"). In that deci-
sion the Commission determined that the County had improperly 
changed the assessment of property owned by Kennecott, and 
leased to Hercules Incorporated ("Hercules"), so as to deny 
assessment of that property as agricultural under the Utah 
Farmland Assessment Act, Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-501 et seq. 
(1987). The property consists of approximately 3,990 acres 
owned by Kennecott, which is leased both to Hercules and to two 
farm and ranch operations for grazing beef cattle and growing 
red winter wheat. The decision of the Commission determining 
that this property was to be assessed under the Utah Farmland 
Assessment Act, supra, was issued on September 10, 1987. Peti-
tion for Writ of Review was filed by the County on October 8, 
1987. The Writ of Review was issued on October 8, 1987. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the County erroneously remove the property 
subject to this appeal from assessment under the Utah Farmland 
Assessment Act, even though that land is actively used for 
agricultural production? 
2. If the property is otherwise qualified for 
assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act, does the 
property become disqualified because it is also leased to 
Hercules? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The property subject to this appeal consists of 
approximately 3,990 acres, in 14 parcels, surrounding a rocket 
motor manufacturing plant being constructed by Hercules in 
1985. The parcel upon which Hercules1 rocket motor manufactur-
ing facility is located is also leased by Hercules from 
Kennecott, under the same lease as is the property which is the 
subject of this appeal. 
Fifteen hundred (1500) acres of the property involved 
in this appeal are also leased by Kennecott to Don Rushton, who 
grows red winter wheat on that property. The remainder of the 
3,990 acres of property is leased to Johnson Cattle Company, 
along with approximately 11,000 other acres of Kennecott 
property. Johnson Cattle Company grazes beef cattle on this 
property. 
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Despite qualification of Kennecott's property for 
agricultural assessmentr the County arbitrarily, and without 
justification, removed the property leased to Don Rushton and 
Johnson Cattle Company from assessment under the Utah Farmland 
Assessment Act. For many years prior to 1985 the subject 
property was assessed by the County under the Utah Farmland 
Assessment Act because it was used for agricultural purposes. 
(Rec. 89, 584-590, 591-594). After receiving notice that the 
County would not assess this property under the Farmland 
Assessment Act in 1985, even though it had done so for at least 
two years prior to 1985, Kennecott filed a notice of appeal 
with the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization, which Board 
denied Kennecott the relief it sought. (Rec. 103-109). There-
after, Kennecott appealed that denial to the Commission. 
The Commission, on September 3, 1986, issued an 
informal decision reversing the County's decision and determin-
ing that the land was actively devoted to agricultural use, 
including grazing beef cattle and growing grain, and that as 
such, was subject to valuation and assessment under the Utah 
Farmland Assessment Act pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. S 59-5-90 (Supp. 1986). (Rec. 88-95). The Commission 
further determined that Hercules' rights to the subject prop-
erty, under its lease with Kennecott, did not preclude assess-
ment of this property under the provisions of the Utah Farmland 
Assessment Act. (Rec. 92). The specific finding of the 
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Commission was that Hercules, under its lease, had only the 
right to restrict the construction of habitable buildings by 
Kennecott, or any other person, on the property, and that the 
property was fully subject to being leased or otherwise devoted 
to agricultural use by Kennecott. (Rec. 92). 
The County then filed a petition for formal hearing 
with the Commission. A formal hearing was held on December 30, 
1986. On September 10, 1987 the Commission issued its formal 
decision determining that the property was qualified for 
assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act and ordered 
the Salt Lake County Assessor to assess the land as agricul-
tural property and to continue so assessing the land under the 
Utah Farmland Assessment Act until the property failed to meet 
the requirements of that Act. (Rec. 44-52). The County there-
upon filed a petition for writ of review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The approximate 3,990 acres which are the subject of 
this appeal are owned by Kennecott and are leased by Kennecott 
to Don Rushton, to Johnson Cattle Company and to Hercules. 
(Rec. 44-52, 88-95, 584-590, 591-594). In addition to this 
property which is leased to Hercules, Kennecott also leases an 
additional 317 acre parcel to Hercules. (Rec. 47, 88-89, 
542-551). Upon this additional parcel Hercules was construct-
ing, at the time of assessment, a rocket motor manufacturing 
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facility. (Rec. 47, 88-89, 542-551). The parcel upon which the 
rocket motor manufacturing facility was being constructed is 
not part of this appeal, and neither Kennecott nor Hercules is 
asserting that this 317 acre parcel is properly qualified for 
assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act. (Rec. 47, 
88-89, 542-551). 
In addition to leasing this 317 acre site, Hercules 
determined it needed to be able to restrict activities upon 
surrounding property so as to preclude any habitable buildings 
being constructed and to foreclose the storage of explosives or 
flammable materials. (Rec. 44-52, 88-95, 622-23). As a result, 
in addition to the 317 acre site for the rocket motor manufac-
turing facility, Hercules also leased from Kennecott approxi-
mately 3,600 acres surrounding the manufacturing site. The 
only restrictions in Hercules' lease with Kennecott on the 
property surrounding Hercules' manufacturing facility was that 
no habitable buildings could be constructed, and no explosives 
or flammable materials could be stored. (Rec. 622-623). Other 
uses of this property by Kennecott, or by persons to whom 
Kennecott may lease, including agricultural uses, were not 
restricted. (Rec. 92). Thus, under its lease with Hercules, 
Kennecott retained the right to either actively devote the 
property to agricultural use itself, or to lease the property 
to farmers and ranchers for agricultural use. (Rec. 622-623.) 
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Kennecott has actively devoted this property, before 
its lease to Hercules, to agricultural use and production by 
leasing it to Johnson Cattle Company and to Don Rushton. (Rec. 
92, 584-590, 591-594). Johnson Cattle Company has grazed beef 
cattle on a part of the property, Don Rushton has grown red 
winter wheat on the other portion of the property. (Rec. 92, 
584-590, 591-594). Agricultural use continued after 
Kennecott's lease to Hercules. (Rec. 92, 584-590, 591-594). 
There is no dispute that the property which is the subject of 
this appeal is used by Kennecott's lessees, Johnson Cattle 
Company and Don Rushton, for agricultural purposes. (Rec. 92, 
584-590, 591-594). Hercules' lease with Kennecott merely 
operates much in the same fashion as does a restrictive cove-
nant. (Rec. 92). Kennecott may use the property for any 
purpose it desires just so long as no habitable structures are 
constructed, and no explosives or flammable materials are 
stored on the property. (Rec. 622-623). 
The Commission, after an informal, and a subsequent 
formal hearing, determined that the property was qualified for 
assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act. The Commis-
sion found that the property fully complied with the require-
ments of Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-87 (Supp. 1986), as follows: 
3. Although the land owner must 
apply for FAA assessment, if the land is 
actively devoted to agricultural use, is 
five contiguous acres or more in area, and 
has a gross income from agricultural 
activities of at least $1000 per year, the 
land is to be valued at the value which the 
land has for agricultural use if it has 
been held in agricultural use for at least 
two years at the time of application. Utah 
Code Ann. S 59-5-87 (Supp. 1966). 
4. Grazing beef cattle and growing 
grain crops are agricultural uses. Utah 
Code Ann. S 59-5-88 (1953). (Rec. 49-50). 
The Commission determined that the County had erro-
neously and improperly assessed the property, and directed the 
County to assess the property as property devoted to an agri-
cultural use under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act, and to 
continue to so assess that property until it was removed from 
agricultural use. (Rec. 49-51). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The property owned by Kennecott, and concurrently 
leased to Hercules, and to Don Rushton and Johnson Cattle 
Company, is qualified for assessment under the Utah Farmland 
Assessment Act because that property is being actively used for 
grazing beef cattle and growing red winter wheat. As such, it 
is property which is "actively devoted to an agricultural use." 
The property also provides a buffer zone between a 
rocket motor manufacturing facility and other habitable struc-
tures, or other property upon which habitable structures can be 
constructed. Hercules leases the property in order to restrict 
the construction of habitable buildings on property surrounding 
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its rocket motor manufacturing facility pursuant to the provi-
sions of federal, state and local law. This is done for safety 
purposes by Hercules. 
Hercules' lease rights only restrict construction of 
habitable buildings, or the storage of explosives or flammable 
materials. The property may be used by Kennecott under its 
lease with Hercules for any other purpose whatsoever, and is so 
used by Kennecott under its leases with Johnson Cattle Company 
and Don Rushton for grazing beef cattle and growing red winter 
wheat. The lease to Hercules by Kennecott does not disqualify 
the property for assessment under Utah's Farmland Assessment 
statute. 
As a result, the Tax Commission was correct in 
determining that this property met the qualifications of the 
Utah Farmland Assessment Act and was to be assessed under that 
statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROPERTY LEASED BY KENNECOTT TO 
HERCULES WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS 
APPEAL, WHICH IS ALSO LEASED TO JOHNSON 
CATTLE COMPANY AND DON RUSHTON, IS USED BY 
KENNECOTT, BY HERCULES, BY JOHNSON CATTLE 
COMPANY, AND BY DON RUSHTON FOR AGRICUL-
TURAL PURPOSES AND SHOULD BE ASSESSED UNDER 
THE UTAH FARMLAND ASSESSMENT ACT. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 59-5-87 (Supp. 1986), provides that 
land which is actively devoted to an agricultural use, which is 
greater than five contiguous acres in area, and which provides 
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a gross income of $1,000 per year, not including rental income, 
is, upon application by the owner, to be assessed as agricul-
tural property. Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-88 (1974) defines 
11
 actively devoted to an agricultural use" as follows: 
Land shall be deemed to be in agricul-
tural use when devoted to the raising of 
plants and animals useful to man, including 
but not limited to: forages and sod crops; 
grains and feed crops; dairy animals, poul-
try, livestock, including beef cattle, 
• . • 
Thus, if property which is in excess of five acres in 
area is used by the owner, or another with the permission of 
the owner, for raising beef cattle, or growing grain, it is 
qualified for assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act 
so long as the property has been so used for at least two years 
prior to the assessment year, and the property produces gross 
revenue in excess of $1,000 per year as a result of the agri-
cultural use. 
There is no question in this case that the approxi-
mately 3,990 acres which are subject to this appeal meet these 
qualifications. The property is more than five contiguous 
acres in area, produces from its agricultural use more than 
$1,000 gross income per year, and has been used for agricul-
tural production for at least two years prior to the date of 
the assessment year here at issue, 1985. (Rec. pp. 49-51) 
The situation presented by this case is very similar 
to the situation presented to the Oregon Supreme Court in Ritch 
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v. Department of Revenue. 261 Or. 78, 493 P.2d 38 (1972). In 
Ritch approximately 96f000 acres were leased by an agency of 
the State of Oregon to Boeing Corporation for "industrial or 
industrial research and development purposes." Id., 493 P.2d 
40. In that case, Boeing granted subleases for agricultural 
purposes to four ranchers living in the general area. Of the 
approximately 96,000 acres, Boeing subleased approximately 
94,000 acres for agricultural purposes. The remaining 2,000 
acres were used by Boeing for industrial development. There 
was no application made for farm use assessment on these 
remaining 2,000 acres. 
The lower court denied to the owner of the property, 
the Department of Veterans Affairs, special farm use assess-
ment. In the Ritch case, the lease to Boeing by the Department 
of Veterans Affairs did not prohibit use of a portion of the 
property for agricultural purposes. Furthermore, in Ritch 
Boeing desired a large tract of ground as a "buffer zone for 
noise suppression between test areas and privately owned prop-
erty." id., 493 p.2d 41. 
The Ritch court, in addressing the argument that 
because the land was used as an industrial buffer zone it 
became industrial property not qualified for agricultural 
assessment, stated as follows: 
For purposes of applying the farm use stat-
ute, we do not believe that Boeing's reason 
for wanting 96,000 acres is as important as 
the use that is actually being made of the 
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property. As of 1969, the tax year 
involved herein, 94,000 acres were actually 
being used for farm purposes. [Emphasis 
added], Id. 
This case presents a situation almost identical to 
that presented in Ritch. In this case Kennecott leases to 
Hercules approximately 3600 acres which Hercules desires in 
order to buffer Hercules1 activities as a rocket motor manufac-
turer from surrounding property. Hercules does this so that no 
habitable structures will be adversely impacted by Hercules1 
activities. However, just as in Ritch, where Boeing permitted 
agricultural activities to occur on the property which it 
leased from the state as an industrial buffer zone, Hercules 
permits agricultural use on its leased property. As a result, 
just as in Ritch, the property is "actively devoted to an agri-
cultural use." 
The County argues that because this ground is subject 
to a lease to Hercules, the property is not being "actively 
devoted to an agricultural use". However, the use to which the 
property is being put is agricultural. There was agricultural 
production on this property in the assessment year, and for at 
least two years prior thereto. Kennecott believes the language 
from Ritch by the Oregon Supreme Court may provide guidance in 
this case. In determining that the property in Ritch was qual-
ified for farm land assessment under the Oregon statute, the 
Oregon Supreme Court stated as follows: 
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Apparently the plaintiff's primary objec-
tion to the lands receiving a farm use 
classification is that neither the Depart-
ment of Veterans' Affairs, as the owner, 
nor Boeing Company, as the lessee, is the 
one who is doing the actual farming on the 
lands. Farm lands are not rendered ineli-
gible for farm use classification merely 
because they are subject to a lease or a 
sublease. [Emphasis added.] It is not 
necessary that the owner of the lands be 
the one who prepares the soil and harvests 
the crop. If this were true, then many 
prime farm lands in the state would be 
denied farm use classification because of 
the ownership of the land, not because of 
the use of the land. It is true that ORS 
308.375 requires the application for spe-
cial farm use assessment for unzoned farm 
lands to be made by the owner for farm use 
classification. ORS 308.380 commands the 
county assessor to consider "the use of the 
land by the owner, renter or operator" in 
determining entitlement to special farm use 
classification. Throughout all the stat-
utes relating to farm use assessment for 
both zoned and unzoned farm lands, all 
references are to the lands and the use 
thereof, e.g., agricultural lands, lands 
devoted to farm use, [emphasis added] oper-
ation of the lands according to agricul-
tural practices, and income from farm use 
of the land. Id. 493 P.2d 41-42. 
This is precisely what is occurring in this case. 
The land at issue has co-ownership, just as the land in Ritch 
had co-ownership. Hercules is a lessee of Kennecott. Hercules 
and Kennecott lease the property to farmers and ranchers for 
agricultural use. The land is used for agricultural purposes 
and is, as a result, "actively devoted to an agricultural use." 
A case similar to this case and to Ritch was decided 
in 1968 by the Connecticut Supreme Court. In Marshall v. Town 
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of Newinqton, 156 Conn. 107, 239 A.2d 478 (1968)f the Connecti-
cut court considered the assessment of certain property under 
Connecticut's Farmland Assessment Act, where the property at 
issue was zoned for industrial use, but was used for growing 
corn. In Marshall the landowner's principal source of income 
from the property was not from the corn which was grown there, 
but was from other sources. 239 A.2d 480-81. 
In determining that the landowner's property quali-
fied for assessment under the Connecticut Farm Land Assessment 
Act, the Marshall court stated: 
Obviously, the conclusion that the produce 
raised on the plaintiffs' land was a minor 
source of their total income from all 
sources is completely irrelevant to the 
question whether they were using a particu-
lar piece of land for farming purposes. 
Equally irrelevant is a finding that adja-
cent industrial lands were sold for high 
prices. Furthermore, although the conclu-
sions that the highest and best use of a 
particular parcel was for industrial pur-
poses and that it was zoned for industrial 
purposes at the request or instigation of 
the owner would be relevant to a determina-
tion of the land's fair market value, such 
conclusions are not relevant to a determi-
nation as to whether in fact the land is 
being used for farming purposes. Id., 239 
A.2d 481. 
And further: 
From this examination, the conclusion is 
inescapable that the court's decision as to 
a proper classification of the land was 
predicated, not on the actual use to which 
the land was being put, which is the 
criterion the statute specifies, but on the 
fact that its highest and best use would be 
for industrial purposes and that at the 
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instigation of the plaintiffs it was in a 
zone which would permit such a use. This 
was error. Id. 
In this case the land is being used, in conformity 
with all lease agreements, for agricultural purposes. The land 
is leased to a rancher in order to raise beef cattle, and is 
leased to a farmer in order to raise red winter wheat. It is 
land which is "actively devoted to an agricultural use." In 
fact, Utah's Farmland Assessment Act requires that this land be 
assessed for agricultural purposes. The Act states as follows: 
The assessor in valuing land which quali-
fies as land actively devoted to agricul-
tural use under the test prescribed by this 
act, and as to which the owner thereof has 
made timely application for valuation, 
assessment and taxation hereunder for the 
tax year in issue, shall consider only 
those indicia of value which such land has 
for agricultural use as determined by the 
state tax commission. Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-5-90 (Supp. 1986). 
Thus, the only relevant questions which the assessor, the 
County and the Tax Commission may inquire into respecting 
assessment under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act are as follows: 
1. What are the "tests prescribed by this Act"? 
2. Has the owner made a timely application for val-
uation, assessment and taxation for the tax year at issue? 
The tests, for agricultural use, prescribed by the 
statute, are clearly set out in Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-89 (Supp. 
1986). The requirements are that the land must: 
(a) Be not less than five contiguous acres in area; 
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(b) Be used for an agricultural purpose as defined 
in the statute under Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-88 (1974); and 
(c) Produce a gross income from agricultural use of 
at least $1,000 per yearf without regard to rental income. 
Under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act the Utah legis-
lature intended that property which is actively being used for 
agricultural purposes is to be assessed under the Act regard-
less of any other use to which the property is being, or may 
be, put. This becomes clear when one examines the enabling 
Utah constitutional provision under which the Utah Farmland 
Assessment Act was enacted. That provision states as follows: 
Land used for agricultural purposes may, as 
the Legislature prescribes, be assessed 
according to its value for agricultural use 
without regard to the value it may have for 
other purposes. Utah Constitution, Art. 
XIII, Sec. 3 (Supp. 1987). 
The legislature has determined that if land in Utah 
is used for agricultural purposes, that land is qualified for 
assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act. That is 
precisely what is presented in this case. Kennecott's property 
is used for an agricultural purpose, agricultural production is 
occurring on that property in every year, and the property 
should be assessed under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act just as 
the property in the Ritch case and the Marshall case were used 
for agricultural purposes and were assessed as agricultural 
property. 
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The County argues that because Kennecott derives sub-
stantial income from this property as a result of Kennecottfs 
lease to Hercules, the property is not qualified for agricul-
tural assessment. The argument is that this means the 
property's primary, or main use, is industrial, not agricul-
tural. However, the Utah legislature has determined that other 
uses to which property in agricultural use can, is, or may be, 
put are not relevant in considering whether that land qualifies 
for assessment under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act. The leg-
islature set out a use test in Utah's Farmland Assessment Act. 
In order to qualify for agricultural assessment, the property, 
in simple terms, only needs to meet the use test set out in the 
statute. Consequently, although the arguments presented by the 
County have some appeal, they are properly addressed to the 
Utah legislature and not to this court. If the County desires 
Utah's Farmland Assessment Act to be applied only to property 
which is primarily, mainly, or mostly used for agricultural 
purposes, it should address those arguments to the Utah legis-
lature, not to this court. 
If this income test argument which is advanced by the 
County is adopted then large blocks of land in Utah which are 
in agricultural production, i.e. "actively devoted to agricul-
tural use", will no longer fit within Utah's Farmland Assess-
ment Act. In certain portions of this state substantial roy-
alty income from oil and gas production is paid to farmers as a 
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result of petroleum production from reserves underlying those 
farmers' properties. Under the County's view, this royalty 
income could operate to disqualify these lands for agricultural 
assessment. Certainly, Utah's legislature never intended this 
result. It may be this is the reason why Utah's legislature 
did not include a comparative income test in Utah's Farmland 
Assessment Act as is a requirement for agricultural assessment 
in some other states. See W.R. Company v. North Carolina Prop-
erty Tax Comm., 48 NC App. 245, 269 S.E.2d 636 (1980). 
In order to infuse some measure of credibility in its 
argument, the County has sought the definition of "devoted" 
from numerous sources including case law speaking to recrea-
tional use of property, i.e. Otis Lodge, Inc. v. Comm. of Taxa-
tion 295 Minn. 80, 206 N.W.2d 3 (1972), admiralty, Complaint 
of McLinn, 744 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1984), and Webster's Ninth 
New Collegiate Dictionary. This may well be useful if "devoted 
to agricultural use" has a vague or uncertain meaning under 
Utah's Farmland Assessment Act. However, the meaning of the 
term "actively devoted to agricultural use" in the Utah Farm-
land Assessment Act is clear from the context within which the 
term is used. 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-88 (1974), supra, states that 
"land shall be deemed to be in agricultural use when devoted to 
[i.e. being used for the purpose of] raising of plants and ani-
mals useful to man, . . ." Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-91 (1974) 
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imposes a rollback tax on land which has been assessed under 
the Farmland Assessment Act when the land is "applied to a use 
other than agricultural, . • ." Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-95(1) 
(Supp. 1986) provides that application for assessment under 
Utah's Farmland Assessment Act for "taxation of land in agri-
cultural use under this act. . ." is to be on a form promul-
gated by the Commission. Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-96 (1974) 
states that agricultural assessment is to continue so long as 
the land remains in agricultural use. It reads as follows: 
Continuance of valuation, assessment and 
taxation under this act shall depend upon 
continuance of the land in agricultural use 
and compliance with the other requirements 
of this act and not upon continuance in the 
same owner of title to the land. Liability 
to the roll-back tax shall attach when a 
change in use of the land occurs but not 
when a change in ownership of the title 
takes place if the new owner continues the 
land in agricultural use, under the condi-
tions prescribed in this act. 
Obviously, the Utah legislature in enacting the Utah Farmland 
Assessment Act intended that the only relevant criteria for 
determining assessment under the Act was to be the actual use 
of the property. Kennecott's property is used for agricultural 
purposes, and should be assessed under Utah's Farmland Assess-
ment Act. 
Maryland has a statute similar to Utah's in permit-
ting assessment for agricultural purposes under a Farmland 
Assessment Act when the land is "actively devoted to farm or 
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agricultural use," See Supervisor of Assessments for 
Montgomery County y, Alsop, 232 Md. 188, 192 A.2d 484, 485 
(1963). In the Alsop case, supra, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals, (Maryland's highest court), considered whether or not 
an owner of property, who acquired the property for purposes of 
a country estate, in order to obtain "peace of mind", with no 
intention of farming the property or becoming a farmer, could 
have his property qualify for agricultural assessment under 
Maryland's Farmland Assessment Act if he "permitted a neighbor-
ing farmer to graze his cattle on the property, and to use some 
of the buildings thereon in return for keeping the hay cut and 
doing general maintenance work on or about the property, 
without monetary consideration." Id. In that case the Maryland 
Tax Court, the trial court in that case, denied farmland 
assessment. In reviewing the Maryland Tax Court's decision, 
and in determining that the property at issue qualified for 
assessment under Maryland's Farmland Assessment Act, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
The tax court seems to have miscon-
strued both the letter and policy of the 
constitutional and statutory provisions 
and, by so doing, misapplied the law to the 
facts. Not only did the Legislature 
declare that it was in the general public 
interest that farming be fostered and 
encouraged in order to maintain readily 
available sources of food and dairy prod-
ucts, to promote the continued preservation 
of open spaces and to prevent the forced 
conversation of such spaces to more inten-
sive uses as a result of economic pressures 
caused by the assessment of land at a rate 
-19-
incompatible with the practical use of such 
land for farming or other agricultural 
purposes; but the constitutional and 
statutory provisions are explicit that the 
assessment of farm land shall be based on a 
valuation commensurate with the use of such 
land for farming. We think the application 
of the law to the facts of this case 
impelled the finding of a taxable basis 
that was favorable to the taxpayer rather 
than the taxing authority. [Citations 
omitted]. 
As we see it, the question here is not 
whether the owner and taxpayer is person-
ally engaged in a bona fide farm operation 
or is permitting a neighbor to use the land 
for grazing cattle without monetary consid-
eration, but instead is whether the land is 
actively devoted to a "farm or agricultural 
use." We think it was so used. Id. 192 
A.2d 486-87. 
Just as in Alsop, Kennecott's land is actively 
devoted to an agricultural use. The property is farmed; beef 
cattle are raised and red winter wheat is grown. It should be 
assessed under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act. 
II. NEITHER UTAH'S PRIVILEGE TAX, NOR PROPERTY 
TAX EXEMPTION LAW, APPLIES TO THIS CASE. 
The County seeks to obtain, via the back door, what 
it cannot obtain by the front door. It does so by arguing that 
if Kennecott's land qualifies for agricultural assessment then 
Kennecott should be required to pay a privilege tax on the dif-
ference between the property's assessment for agricultural pur-
poses and its assessment otherwise. See Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-13-73 (Supp. 1986). 
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However, the privilege tax, by its own terms, only 
applies to property which "is exempt from taxation." 
Kennecott's property is not exempt. Under Utah's Farmland 
Assessment Act this property is simply assessed on a different 
basis than is other property. The property is much like mining 
property, i.e. not exempt but assessed on a different basis and 
by a different method than other property. See Article XIII, 
Sec. 4, Utah Constitution. Kennecott still pays taxes on this 
property and will pay taxes even if the property is assessed 
under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act. In fact, this property 
will have the same tax levy applied against its assessed value 
as is applied against the assessed value of all other taxable 
property in the same taxing district. 
The assessment of this property as agricultural prop-
erty does not constitute an exemption as argued by the County. 
The exemptions to which Utah's privilege tax apply are set out 
in Article 13, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution. Article 13, 
Section 3(2) of the Utah Constitution is that provision which 
enables the legislature to prescribe by statute that land used 
for agricultural purposes is to be assessed based upon its 
agricultural use. Agricultural assessment does not constitute 
an exemption to which the privilege tax applies. 
If the privilege tax were to apply, Utah's Farmland 
Assessment Act would become completely meaningless. Under the 
County's argument, any property owner whose property qualified 
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for agricultural assessment would be subject to privilege taxes 
on any difference between agricultural value, or assessment, 
and assessment based upon "fair market or full market value." 
This cannot be what the legislature intended, or what the peo-
ple of the State of Utah intended, when Utah's legislature 
enacted the privilege tax statute, when the legislature enacted 
the Utah Farmland Assessment Act, or when the people of this 
state adopted Article XIII, Section 3(2) of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The County argues that the case law dealing with 
property tax exemptions in the State of Utah and elsewhere 
applies in construing the language of the Utah Farmland Assess-
ment Act. The argument is that because exemptions are to be 
narrowly construed, the benefit of Utah's Farmland Assessment 
Act is to be narrowly extended so as to preclude Kennecott's 
benefitting from that statute. However, as is pointed out 
above, agricultural assessment is not an exemption to which the 
case law addressing exemptions applies. This becomes obvious 
when one examines the Utah constitutional provisions relating 
to taxation found in Article XIII of the Utah Constitution. 
Utah Constitution Article XIII, Sec. 3, provides, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
The legislature shall provide by law a 
uniform and equal rate of assessment on all 
tangible property in the state, according 
to its value in money, except as otherwise 
provided in Section 2 of this Article. 
[Emphas is added]. 
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Article XIIIf Section 2 lists tae exemptions from 
taxation in Utah. Article XIII, Section 3 of the Utah Consti-
tution refers to Article XIII, Section 2 in speaking to prop-
erty tax exemptions. Article XIII, Section 3 contains the 
provision of the Utah Constitution which enables the legisla-
ture to enact the Utah Farmland Assessment Act, and to pre-
scribe that property used for agricultural purposes is to be 
assessed based upon its agricultural use. Thus, both the Utah 
legislature and the people of Utah do not consider agricultural 
assessment under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act to be either 
a full or partial tax exemption. The exemptions are set out in 
the Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, and no exemp-
tions are contained in Article XIII, Section 3 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Thus, all the law, and those citations by the County 
in its brief relating to tax exemptions, how exemptions are to 
be construed, and who is to benefit from exemptions, simply do 
not apply in this case. Agricultural assessment is not the 
same, and cannot be considered to be the same, as tax exemption 
under Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
Kennecott, in leasing this property to Johnson Cattle 
Company and Don Rushton for the production of beef cattle and 
red winter wheat, has "actively devoted" its land to an agri-
cultural use. Because that land is actively devoted to an 
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agricultural use, and has been devoted for at least two years 
prior to 1985, because the agricultural use of this land 
generates in excess of $1,000 per year in gross income, and 
because this land has had an application properly submitted, it 
must be assessed under Utah's Farmland Assessment Act. 
The Utah legislature, in enacting the Utah Farmland 
Assessment Act, and the people of Utah in adopting Article 13, 
Section 3(2) of the Utah Constitution, intended to encourage 
landowners to keep their land in agricultural production. That 
is precisely what is being achieved in this case. Hercules 
needs this property in order to buffer its rocket manufacturing 
facilities from neighboring landowners who might construct 
habitable dwellings. In order to achieve that buffer, Hercules 
entered into a lease with Kennecott. Both Kennecott and 
Hercules have continued to lease the property for agricultural 
production purposes. The land is used for agricultural 
production. 
As a result, the decision of the Commission should be 
affirmed and the County should be required to assess this 
property under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act. 
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ADDENDUM 
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Sec. 2. [Tangible property to be taxed — Value ascer 
tained — Exemption of state and municipal prop 
erty — Exemption of tangible personal property 
held for sale or processing — Exemption of prop 
erty used for irrigating land — Exemption o 
property used for electrical power — Remittance 
or abatement of taxes of poor — Exemption or 
residential and household property — Disabled 
veterans' exemption — Intangible property — 
Legislature to provide annual tax for state.] 
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the 
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and 
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. 
(2) The following are property tax exemptions: 
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and public libraries; 
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all 
other political subdivisions of the state, except that to the extent and in 
the manner provided by the Legislature the property of a county, city, 
town, special district or other political subdivision of the state located 
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to 
the ad valorem property tax; 
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for 
religious, charitable or educational purposes; 
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit; and 
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by statute. This 
exemption shall be implemented over a period of time as provided by 
statute. 
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., which is 
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final destination outside 
75 
Art. XIII, § 2 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no 
situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be ex-
empted by law from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or pro-
duced or otherwise originating within or without the state. 
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., held for 
sale in the ordinary course of business and which constitutes the inventory of 
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may 
be deemed for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted. 
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, 
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corpo-
rations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals or 
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxa-
tion to the extent that they shall be owned and used for such purposes. 
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for 
generating and delivering electrical power, a portion of which is used for 
furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in the 
state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to the extent that such property 
is used for such purposes. These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the 
users of water so pumped under such regulations as the Legislature may 
prescribe. 
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in 
such manner as may be provided by law. 
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of 
not to exceed 45% of the fair market value of residential property as defined 
by law; and all household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclu-
sively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for 
himself andt family. 
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the mili-
tary service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried 
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of persons who while 
serving in the military service of the United States or the state of Utah were 
killed in action or died as a result of such service may be exempted as the 
Legislature may provide. 
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as property or it 
may be taxed as property in such manner and to such extent as the Legisla-
ture may provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also 
be taxed. Provided that if intangible property is taxed as property the rate 
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation. 
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with 
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the 
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any there 
be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay 
the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, within twenty years 
from the final passage of the law creating the debt. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1979 proposed 
amendments to this section by House Joint 
Resolutions Nos 23 and 25 were repealed and 
withdrawn by Senate Joint Resolution No. 6, 
Laws 1980 
Laws 1980, Senate Joint Resolution No. 6, 
proposed to amend Article XIII. The proposed 
amendment was submitted to the electors at 
the general election in 1980 and failed to pass 
because it did not receive the necessary major-
i t y
' 
The 1982 amendment was proposed by Sen-
ate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1982 and was 
approved at the general election on November 
2, 1982 to become effective January 1, 1983. 
Prior to amendment, the section read as fol-
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Sec. 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property — 
Livestock — Land used for agricultural pur-
poses.] 
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assess-
ment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money, 
except as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The Legislature shall 
prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxa^on 
of such property, so that every person and corporation shall p v a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, prowaed that the 
Legislature may determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock. 
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the Legislature prescribes, 
be assessed according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the 
value it may have for other purposes. 
Sec. 4. [Mines and claims to be assessed — Basis and mul-
tiple — What to be assessed as tangible property-] 
All metalliferous mines or mining claims, both placer and rock in place, 
shall be assessed as the Legislature shall provide; but the basis and multiple 
now used in determining the value of metalliferous mines for taxation pur-
poses and the additional assessed value of $5.00 per acre thereof shall not be 
changed before January 1, 1935, nor thereafter until otherwise provided by 
law. All other mines or mining claims and other valuable mineral deposits, 
including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons and all machinery used in 
mining and all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to 
mines or mining claims, and the value of any surface use made of mining 
claims, or mining property for other than mining purposes, shall be assessed 
as other tangible property. 
PART 5 
FARMLAND ASSESSMENT ACT 
59-2-501. Short title. 
This part is known as the "Farmland Assessment Act." 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-86, enacted by L. known and may be cited as the Tannland As-
1969, ch. 180, § 1; renumbered by L. 1987, sessment Act of 1969'". 
ch. 4, § 103. Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
 c n 4> § 307 provides- This act has retrospec-
ment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered
 t i v e operation to January 1, 1987, except for 
this section which was formerly § 59-5-86 and Sections 59-2-201, 59-2-205 and 59-2-207 
substituted the present provisions for the for-
 w h l c h u k e e f f e c t J a n x 1 9 g g „ 
mer provisions which read This act shall be 
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59-5-86 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
Section for other than agricultural 
59-5-97. Separation of land — Use of part purposes. 
59-5-86. Short title of act. 
Law Reviews. — Preserving Utah's Open 
Spaces, Owen Olpin, 1973 Utah L. Rev 164. 
59-5-87. Value of land actively devoted to agricultural 
use. 
(1) For general property tax purposes and land subject to the privilege 
tax imposed by section 59-13-73 owned by the state or any political subdivi-
sion thereof, the value of land, not less than five contiguous acres in area, 
unless otherwise provided under subsection (2), which has a gross income, 
not including rental income, of $1000 per year, is actively devoted to agri-
cultural use, which has been so devoted for at least two successive years 
immediately preceding the tax year in issue, shall, on application of that 
owner, and approval thereof as hereinafter provided, be that value which 
such land has for agricultural use. 
(2) The tax commission may grant a waiver of the acreage limitation, 
upon appeal by the owner and submission of proof that the owner or a 
purchaser or lessee obtains 807c or more of his income from agricultural 
products on an area of less than five contiguous acres. 
(3) The tax commission may grant a waiver of the income limitation for 
the tax year in issue, upon appeal by the owner and submission of proof 
that the land has been valued on the basis of agricultural use for at least 
two years immediately preceding that tax year, and that the failure to meet 
the income requirements for that tax year was due to no fault or act of the 
owner or a purchaser or lessee, whether that act is one of omission or 
commission. "Fault" shall not be construed to include the intentional plant-
ing of crops or trees which because of the maturation period of such crops or 
trees prevent the owner, purchaser, or lessee from achieving the income 
59-5-88. "Agricultural use" defined.—Land shall be deemed to be in 
agricultural use when devoted to the raising of plants and animals useful to 
man, including but not limited to: forages and sod crops; grains and feed 
crops; dairy animals, poultry, livestock, mekdiu~ beef cattle, sheep, swine, 
horses, ponies, mules or goats including the breeding and grazing of any or 
all of such animals; bees, fur animals, trees, fruits of all kinds, including 
grapes, nuts and berries; vegetables, nursery, floral, and ornamental stock; 
or when devoted to and meeting the requirements and qualifications for 
payments or other compensation pursuant to a crop-land retirement pro-
gram under an agreement with an agency of the state or federal govern-
ment 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-88, enacted by L. CoUateral Eeferences. 
1969, ch. 180, § 3. Taxation<S=>348. 
84 (U.8. Taxation § 411. 
59-5-89, Land actively devoted to agricultural use — Ad-
ditional requirements — Application for as-
sessment under act — Change in land use — 
Land used for religious or charitable purposes. 
Land which is actively devoted to agricultural use is eligible for valua-
tion, assessment and taxation each year it meets the following 
qualifications: 
(1) It has been so devoted for at least the two successive years imme-
diately preceding the tax year for which valuation under this act is 
requested; 
(2) The area of land is not less than five contiguous acres when 
measured in accordance with the provisions of section 59-5-94, except 
where devoted to agricultural use in conjunction with other eligible 
acreage, and when the gross sales of agricultural products produced 
thereon together with any payments received under a crop-land retire-
ment program have averaged at least $1000 per year, not including 
rental income, during the two year period immediately preceding the 
tax year in issue; and 
(3) (a) Application by the owner of the land for valuation hereunder 
is submitted on or before January 1 of the tax year to the county 
assessor in which the land is situated on the form prescribed by the 
state tax commission. The county assessor shall continue to accept 
applications filed within 60 days after January 1 upon payment of 
a late filing fee in the amount of $25, which shall be paid to the 
county treasurer. 
(b) The county assessor shall have all applications filed under 
subsection (a) recorded by the county recorder. All necessary filing 
fees shall be paid by the owner at the time his application is filed. 
Whenever land, which is or has been in agricultural use and is or 
has been valued, assessed and taxed under the provisions of this 
act, is applied to a use other than agricultural, the owner shall, 
within 90 days thereafter, notify the county assessor and pay the 
roll-back tax imposed by section 59-5-91. Upon receipt of notice, 
unless payment of the roll-back tax accompanies that notice, the 
county assessor shall cause the following statement to be recorded 
by the county recorder: "On the day of , 19 , 
this land became subject to the roll-back tax imposed by section 
59-5-91." 
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of (3)(a) and (b) of this sec-
tion, whenever the owner of land has filed or becomes eligible for 
valuation under this act, he need not file again or give any notice 
to the county assessor until a change in the land use occurs. Fail-
ure of the owner to notify the county assessor and pay the roll-back 
tax imposed by section 59-5-91, within 90 days atter any change m 
land use, will subject the owner to a penalty of 100% of the com-
puted roll-back tax due. 
(d) Any change in land use or other withdrawal of land from the 
provisions of this act shall be subject to the provisions of this sec-
tion whether the change or withdrawal is voluntary or involun-
tary, unless the change in use is due to ineligibility resulting 
solely from amendments to this act. 
(e) Land which becomes exempt from taxation as provided in 
section 59-2-30 shall not be considered withdrawn from the provi-
sions of this act as long as the land continues to be used for agricul-
tural purposes. 
59-5-90- "Indicia of value" for agricultural use deter-
mined by tax commission. 
The assessor w "sluing land which qualifies as land actively devoted to 
agricultural use under the test prescribed by this act, and as to which the 
owner thereof has made timely application for valuation, assessment and 
taxation hereunder for the tax year in issue, shall consider only those 
indicia of value which such land has for agricultural use as determined by 
the state tax commission. The county board of equalization shall review the 
assessments each year as provided in section 59-7-1. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-90, enacted **y L. Compiler's Not*s, — The 1975 amend-
1969, ch. 180, S 5; L. 1975, ch. 174, $ 3. ment made no change m this section. 
59-5-91. Assessed land subsequently devoted to other than agricultural 
use—"Roll-back tax"—Definition and determination of amount—Disposition 
of collected tax.—When land which is or has been in agricultural use and 
is or has been valued, assessed and taxed under the provisions of this act, 
is applied to a use other than agricultural, it shall be subject to an addi-
tional tax hereinafter referred to as the "roll-back tax," which tax shall be 
a lien upon the land and become due and payable at the time of the change 
in use. 
As used in this act, the word "roll-back" means the period preceding 
the change in use of the land not to exceed five years during which the 
land was valued, assessed and taxed under the provisions of this act. 
The assessor shall ascertain the amount of the roll-back tax chargeable 
on land which has undergone a change in use by computing the difference 
between the tax paid, while participating under this act, and that which 
would have been paid had the property not been under this act. When the 
assessor has collected the roll-back tax, he shall remit it to the county 
treasurer and certify to the county recorder that the roll-back tax lien 
on the property has been satisfied. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-91, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 180, $ 6; L. 1973, ch. 137, § 3. 
59-5-92. "Roll-back tax" — Lien — Right to review judg-
ment — Procedure. 
The assessment of the roll-back tax imposed by section 59-5-91, the at-
tachment of the lien for such taxes, and the right of the owner or other 
interested party to review any judgment of the county board of equalization 
affecting such roll-back tax, shall be governed by the procedures provided 
for the assessment and taxation of real property not valued, assessed and 
taxed under the provisions of this act. The roll-back tax collected shall be 
paid into the county treasury and paid by the treasurer to the various 
taxing units pro rata in accordance with the levies for the current year. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-92, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. — The 1975 amend-
1969, ch. 180,§ 7; L. 1975, ch. 174,5 4. ment made no change in this section. 
59-5-93. Area included under act—Site of farmhouse excluded—In de-
termining the total area of land actively devoted to agricultural use there 
shall be included the area of all land under barns, sheds, silos, cribs, green-
houses and like structures, lakes, dams, ponds, streams, irrigation ditches 
md like facilities, but land under and such additional land as may be 
ictually used in connection with the farmhouse shall be excluded in deter-
mining such total area. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-93, enacted by L. CoUateral References. 
1969, clL 180, § 8. Taxation<S=348. 
84 C.J.S. Taxation § 411. 
59-5-94. Structures and land—Assessment same as other property.—All 
structures, which are located on land in agricultural use and the farmhouse 
md the land on which the farmhouse is located, together with the additional 
land used in connection therewith, shall be valued, assessed and taxed by 
the same standards, methods and procedures as other taxable structures and 
>ther land in the county. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-94, enacted by L. CoUateral References. 
L969, ch. 180, § 9. TaxationO=>348. 
84 C.J.S. Taxation § 411. 
59-5-95. Application forms — Certification by land-
owner — Consent to audit and review — Pur-
chaser's or lessee's affidavit. 
(1) Application for valuation, assessment and taxation ofland in agricul-
tural use under this act shall be on a form prescribed by the state tax 
commission, and provided fcr the use of th* applicants by the counfv pres-
sor. The form of application shall provide for the reporting of information 
pertinent to the provisions of this act. A certification by the owner that the 
facts set forth in the application are true may be prescribed by the state tax 
commission to be in lieu of a sworn statement to that effect. Statements so 
certified shall be considered as if made under oath and subiect to the same 
penalties as provided by law for perjury. 
(2) All owners applying for participation under the provisions of this act 
and all purchs '^s or lessees signing affidavits as provided under subsec-
tion (3) shall be deemed to have given their consent to be subject to field 
audit and review by both the state tax commission ard the conntv assessor 
and such consent shall be a condition to the acceptance of any application 
or affidavit. 
(3) An owner of lands eligible for valuation, assessment and taxation 
under the provisions of this act due to the use of that land by, and the gross 
income qualifications of, a purchaser or lessee, may qualify those lands by 
submitting together with his application under subsection (1), an affidavit 
from that purchaser or lessee certifying those facts relative to his use of the 
land and his gross income which would be necessary for qualification of 
those lands under the provisions of this act. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-95, enacted by L. Collateral Beferences 
1969, eh. 180, § 10. Taxation<fc=>348. 
84 C.J.8. Taxation § 412. 
59-5-96. Change of ownership.—Continuance of valuation, assessment 
and taxation under this act shall depend upon continuance of the land in 
agricultural use and compliance with the other requirements of this act 
and not upon continuance in the same owner of title to the land. Liability 
to the roll-back tax shall attach when a change in use of the land occurs 
but not when a change in ownership of the title take*, place if the new 
owner continues the land in agricultural use, under the conditions pre-
scribed in this act. 
History: 0. 1953, 59-5-96, enacted by L. Collateral Bcfereiices. 
1969, efa. 180, § 11. TExatione=*S4S. 
U CJ.S. Taxation { 411. 
59-13-73. Privilege tax upon possession and use of tax-
exempt property — Exceptions. 
There is imposed and there shall be collected a tax upon the possession or 
other beneficial use enjoyed by any private individual, association, or cor-
poration of any property, real or personal, which for any reason is exempt 
from taxation, when such property is used in connection with a business 
conducted for profit, except where the use is by way of a concession in or 
relative to the use of a public airport, park, fairground, or similar property 
which is available as a matter of right to the use of the general public, or 
where the possessor or user is a religious, educational or charitable organi-
zation or the proceeds of such use or possession inure to the benefit of such 
religious, educational or charitable organization and not to the benefit of 
any other individual association or corporation. No tax shall be imposed 
upon the possession or other beneficial use of public land occupied undei 
the terms of grazing leases or permits issued bv the United States or the 
state of Utah or upon any easement unless the lease, permit or easement 
entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive possession of the premises to 
which the lease, permit or easement relates. Every lessee, permittee, or 
other holder of a right to remove or extract the mineral covered by his 
lease, right, permit or easement except from brines of the Great Salt Lake 
is deemed to be in possession of the premises, notwithstanding the fact that 
other parties may have a similar right to remove or extract another min-
eral from the same lands or estates. 
